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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Prior to determining the Appellant, John F. Thomon's ("THORNTON's") issues on 
appeal, it is necessary to establish whether or not the Defendant, Kari A. Clark ("CLARK") 1 had 
standing to request declatory relief in the underlying case. CLARK did not own the dominant 
estate associated with the appurtenant easement at issue in this appeal. Therefore, Respondent, 
Mary E. Pandrea ("PANDREA") includes as an additional issue on appeal that CLARK lacked 
standing to claim a right in the appertenant easement. 
The Appellant's Brief challenges the district court's decision that CLARK provided 
evidence to substantiate a right to use an easement appertenant to P ANDREA' s portion of the 
original Warranty Deed, Instrument Number 226223 ("Parcel B") for a parcel other than Parcel 
B. 
THORNTON and PANDREA claim that they are the only owners of the original 5 acre 
Warranty Deed, Instrument Number 226223. The easement at issue in this case benefits the 
dominant 4.44 acres that P ANDREA owns (from the original Warranty Deed, Instrument 
Number 226223); while this easement burdens the servient .56 acre portion (of the original 
Warranty Deed, Instrument Number 226223) owned by THORNTON. (R. Vol. I, p. 69-70; R. 
Vol. I, p. 128-129; Aff. VT, Exhibit Nine; R. Vol. II, p. 390-391) 
This easement was created in 1992, when approximately .56 acres was severed from the 
original 5 acres described in the 1980 Warranty Deed, Instrument Number 226223. Id. This 
1 As indicated by THORNTON's Appellant Brief, the Respondent, Kenneth J. and Deanna L. Barrett 
("BARRETT' s") have replaced CLARK in this litigation. 
RESPONSE BRIEF OF P ANDREA-I 
transaction was recorded in the Bonner County Recorder's Office as Quitclaim Deed, Instrument 
Number 416381. Id. 
The .56 acres conveyed from the original 5 acres in the 1980 Warranty Deed, Instrument 
Number 226223 (as reflected in the 1992 conveyance) has been owned by THORNTON si_nce 
1998. (Aff. JT, Exhibit One-J, R. Vol. II, p. 395-398) The easement reserved within the the .56 
acres (the servient estate) was for the benefit of the remaining 4.44 acre portion of the original 5 
acres (the dominant estate). (R. Vol. I, p. 69-70; R. Vol. I, p. 128-129; Aff. VT, Exhibit Nine; R. 
Vol. II, p. 390-391) 
The remaining 4.44 acres of the original 5 acres is now owned by P ANDREA. (R. Vol. I, 
p. 139, ,r 3) Although the 4.44 acres had been co-owned by P ANDREA and CLARK, ownership 
in this parcel transferred from CLARK to P ANDREA by way of a Judgment and Decree of 
Partition in a separate litigation entered on January 24, 2014. Id. 
As CLARK no longer owns the dominant 4.44 acre estate, CLARK lacked standing to 
claim an "express" or appertenant easement (only reserved for the dominant 4.44 acre estate) to 
benefit an entirely unrelated parcel. 
This is the second appeal before this Court having to do with property rights in two 
parcels of property recently partitioned in Bonner County, Idaho. The first appeal was argued on 
December 11, 2015 before this Court in Boise, Idaho, by the Appellant on appeal in BON-CV-
2011-835, PANDREA, under Docket Number 42333-2014. 
At issue in the preceding appeal was the prejudicial impact of a ten foot wide "road" 
(created by the court) crossing from the southeasterly border of PANDREA's 12.739 acre 
partition parcel to the northwesterly border. This "road" was inaccurately described within 
RESPONSE BRIEF OF P ANDREA-2 
CLARK's partition parcel as an "easement appertenant to the land for ingress and egress through 
and over the parcel awarded to Plaintiff, Mary E. Pandrea as the servient parcel" when in fact, 
the metes and bounds description of the "road" fails to reach any main road to allow for ingress 
and egress. (R. Vol. I, p. 140, ,r 1-3) It should be noted that it is this "road" easement that is 
currently reached by the "appurtenant easement" awarded to CLARK in the present underlying 
case under appeai not to CLARK's parcel. 
The portion of the previous appeal that is of relevance to this appeal is the preclusionary 
affect of Idaho Code § 6-515i that should have legally bound and protected the parties from any 
futher litigation regarding their property rights in the two parcels. This statute mandates that 
"judgment must be rendered such that such partition be effectual forever, which judgment is 
binding and conclusive [ o ]n all persons named as parties to the action, ... or of any part thereof, 
after the determination of a particular estate therein". Idaho Code§ 6-515 
Based on the legally binding affects of Idaho Code§ 6-515, PANDREA includes as a 
second additional issue on appeal, as purely a matter of law, the statutory implications of Idaho 
Code§ 6-515 and whether or not this statute renders the judgment entered in this case unlawful. 
P ANDREA ( as the owner of the dominant estate) was denied joinder with THORNTON 
(as the owner of the servient estate) in the underlying case to defend against the counterclaim 
filed by CLARK. Nonetheless, P ANDREA remains a party in this appeai2. P ANDREA 
respectfully submits her Responding Brief in support of the Appellant, John F. Thornton. 
B. Statement of Facts and Course of Procedings 
2 P ANDREA and THORNTON are in privity of estate in this matter. 
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The factual and procedural histories of this case were previousley set forth in the 
Appellant's Brief filed with this Court on November 18, 2015; therefore, they are summarized 
herein. 
Relevant Facts: 
1. Warranty Deed, Instrument Number 226223 (Parcel B) 
The 4.44 acres of the original Instrument No. 226223 has been referenced as Parcel 1, 
Tax Lot 40, the Pandrea Parcel and herein as Parcel B. The .56 acre portion of the original 
Instrument Number 226223 has been referenced as the Thornton Property and herein as Parcel 
A. The relevant portion of the Chain of Title for Instrument Number 226223 (Parcel A and 
Parcel B) is as follows: 
1998 
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The Supporting Documentation from the record on appeal for the Chain of Tile is as 
follows: 
February 13, 1980 
PANDREA purchased an approximate 5 acre parcel of property on February 13, 1980 
recorded as Warranty Deed, Instrument Number 226223 ( R. Vol. II, p. 417, ,r 3.2; Aff. VT, 
Exhibit Three) Warranty Deed, Instrument Number 226223 was subject to a 30 foot wide utility 
easement "free from all encumbrances, except those presently of record (as of February 13, 
1980) in the office of the records of Bonner County, Idaho". (Aff. VT, Exhibit Three) The 
grantor did not reserve any rights in this parcel upon the sale of this parcel. (Id.) CLARK 
became the co-tenant in this parcel on February 16, 1981. (R. Vol. II, p. 418, ,r 3.3) 
December 1, 1992- Quitclaim Deed 416381 
On December 1, 1992, PANDREA and CLARK conveyed .56 acres of Warranty Deed, 
Instrument Number 226223 lying southeasterly of the centerline of Tavern Creek (to the property 
now owned by THORNTON) by way of the first conveyance described in Quitclaim Deed 
416381, referenced by Appellant as the "Shoreline Piece". (R. Vol. I, p. 69-70; R. Vol. I, p. 128-
129; Aff. VT, Exhibit Nine; R. Vol. II, p. 390-391) 
The remaining 4.44 acre portion of the original Instrument Number 226223 (Parcel B) 
lying Northwesterly of the centerline of Tavern Creek, reserved the use of the Southeasterly 
segment of the utitily easement described in the original 1980 Instrument Number 226223. (Id.) 
RESPONSE BRIEF OF P ANDREA-5 
January 24, 2014 
On January 24, 2014, the entirty of CLARK's ownership in Instrument Number 226223 
(Parcel B) transferred to P ANDREA by way of a Decree of Partition in a previous litigation 
under BON-CV-2011-835. (R. Vol. I, p. 139, 1 3) This transfer of ownership included any 
"appurtenances thereon" which was described in the Record of Survey as: 
The portion of the 30' wide access and utility easement through the Thornton 
property may be appurtenant to the Pandrea parcel as it was originally contained 
within Inst. # 226223. However, when Inst. #226223 extended to the County Road, the 
property was SUBJECT TO the 30' easement. Subsequent deed, Instrument No. 525386, 
reserved the same easement for the benefit of remainder of Instrument No. 226223, 
after deeding a portion of that parcel in Instrument No. 525386. 
(R. Vol. I. p. 143, Easement Note) 
February 25, 2015 
The Final Judgment was entered in BON-CV-2013-1334 whereby the district court 
ordered, adjudged and decreed that "as set forth in Warranty Deed, Bonner County Instrument 
Number 525386 and Quitclaim Deed, Bonner County Instrument Number 416381" that CLARK 
has a "30.0 foot appurtenant easement for road right of way and utilities across" the 
THORNTON .56 acre tract "being a portion of that easement previously described in 
Instrument No. 226223" and "the right to use said easement for a right of way and utilities to 
the following described ten and 423/IOOOs (10.423) acres of real property that were awarded to 
KARI A. CLARK pursuant to the revised Judgment and Decree of Partition entered in Bonner 
County Case No. CV-2011-835 ... being a portion of that parcel described in Instrument No. 
396781". (Second Amended Final Judgment, Attachment 9, p. 2-3; to the Augmented Record on 
Appeal) 
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2. Warranty Deed, Instrument Number 525386 (Parcel A) 
In 1998, THORNTON purchased two tracts of land by way of Warranty Deed, 
Instrument Number 525386 (Parcel A). A Notice Section was included on the deed to Parcel A 
of an easement reserved in the second tract of land described in the deed. This specifically 
referenced Instrument Number 416381, the names of the grantors on the deed (P ANDREA and 
CLARK), and the date the deed was recorded, 1992. (Aff. IT, Exhibit One-J, R. Vol. II, p. 395-
398) 
3. Warranty Deed, Instrument Number 396781 (Parcel C) 
October 17, 1991 
Warranty Deed, Instrument Number 396781 (Parcel C) was purchased in 1991, and co-
owned byPANDREA and CLARK. (R. Vol. 418, 13.5) 
Parcel C was described as "TOGETHER WITH and subject to a 30 foot easement for a 
road right of way and utilities on existing road . .. ". ( Aff. VT, Exhibit Five) 
The "Existing Road" easement (also referenced as the "upper road") runs from the county 
road, crossing over and through Parcel C, and was recorded in 1975 under Instrument Number 
170365 as a dedicated permanent Easement for "the owners of certain properties in Trust"; said 
properties including Parcel C. (R. V. II, p. 364-366) 
January 24, 2014 
As a result of the partition action, on January 24, 2014, CLARK received 10.423 acres of 
Instrument Number 396781 and "any appurtenances thereon". (R. Vol. I, p. 140, 1 2) 
PANDREA received the remaining 8.299 acres and "any appurtenances thereon". (R. Vol. I, p. 
139, ft 2) 
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R. Vol. I, p. 143 
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was SUBJECT TO the 30' easement. Subsequent deed, Instrument No. 525386, reserved 
the same easement/or the benefit of remainder of Instrument No. 226223, after 
deeding a portion of that parcel in Instrument No. 525386. 
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Relevant Procedural History: 
On December 9, 2013, CLARK filed her answers, affirmative defenses and a 
counterclaim in response to THORNTON's original complaint in BON-CV-2013-1334. (R. Vol. 
I, pp.60-66) 
On January 24, 2014, the case in BON-CV-2011-835 concluded and a Judgment and 
Decree of Partition was entered. It was also "ordered, adjudged and decreed that the Decree of 
Partition shall be effectual forever, and judgment is binding and conclusive: 1. On all persons 
named as parties to the action ... " (Vol. 1, P. 141, 15). IC.§ 6-5153 
As a result of the partition, CLARK did not receive any transfer of interest in the 30 
foot utility easement originally described in Instrument Number 226223 lying Southeasterly 
of the centerline of Tavern Creek and reserved in Instrument Number 416381. (Vol. I, p. 140-
141) 
Just five days later, on January 29, 2014, CLARK motioned for partial summary 
judgment on her declatory judgment claim in BON-CV-2013-1334 arguing that that she had an 
"express easement" over the Thornton property by virtue of the language in Instrument Number 
416381 (even though she was denied this request in BON-CV-2011-835). (R. Vol. II, p. 266, ii 
1) 
CLAR.K's motion was based on the allegations within her counterclaim that: 
3 See endnote "i" 
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1. Since the 1980's, MARYE. PANDREA (hereinafter "PANDREA''), and CLARK 
have been joint owners of an approximate 20 acre parcel of property in Bonner County along 
the Pack River. (R. Vol. I, p. 63, ,r 5) 
2. Since the 1940's, the road through the two acre parcel now owned by 
THORNTON, which is subject to an easement in favor of CLARK as set forth in the 1992 
Quitclaim Deed4, has been continually used, and was the only road used, by CLARK and her 
family to access the 20 acre parcel jointly owned by CLARK and P ANDREA. In addition, the 
road through THORNTON'S 2 acre parcel is the only access to the 20 acre parcel jointly owned 
by CLARK and PANDREA and said road is the only viable option for accessing CLARK'S 
parcel. (R. Vol. I, p. 64, ,r 1) 
3. CLARK alleges that she has lawfully acquired the right to use and access the road 
through THORNTON'S two acre parcel by way of an express easement appurtenant, as set forth 
in the 1992 Quitclaim Deed, Instrument No. 416381. (R. Vol. I, P. 64, ,r 4) 
On March 14, 2014, the district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of 
CLARK on her alleged claim of right to use the easement reserved in Instrument Number 
416381. (R. Vol. II, p. 266, ,r 1) 
The district court also granted CLARK's motion to strike the filings made by 
PANDREA, including: her memorandum supporting THORNTON's response to the partial 
summary judgment; affidavits in support of her memorandum; and the response to CLAR.K's 
motion to strike. (R. Vol. II, p. 287, ,r 4, ,r 5) 
4 Referencing Instrument Number 416381 (R. Vol. I, p. 63, ,r,[ 6, 7, 8) 
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The district court relied on the representations and the affidavit of CLARK's counsel; 
Joel P. Hazel, to support its memorandum decision, order and subsequent Judgment on this 
motion. (R. Vol. II, p. 272, ,r 2, Ll. 2-6) 
The district court also relied on the affidavit of CLARK's niece; TERRI BOYD-DAVIS 
(who is DEANNA BARRETT's sister and the legal assistant to the BARRETT's attorney of 
record, MICHAEL G. SCHMIDT), to support its memorandum decision, order and subsequent 
Judgment on this motion. (R. Vol. II, p. 272, Ll. 7-9) 
Judgment was entered on April 30, 2014. (R. Vol. II., p. 528, ,r 1, LL 11-12) 
THORNTON and PANDREA5 both attempted to correct the factual and legal errors 
made by the district court by filing reconsideration motions, which were both denied on June 2, 
2014. (R. Vol. II, p. 552-553) 
A Final Amended Judgment was ordered by this Court and entered as such on February 
25, 2015 (Respondent's Augmented Motion, Attachment 9). 
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
In addition to the Issues presented on Appeal by THORNTON, as issues 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 
7, 8, 9, 10 and 11, PANDREA presents the following additional issues: 
12. CLARK did not own the dominant estate to the THORNTON servient estate 
and did not have standing to request a declatory judgment granting the relief 
CLARK received. 
5 Thornton filed his motion on May 6, 2014, and Pandrea filed her motion on April 23, 2014. Pandrea 
and Thornton stipulated to dismiss the claims by Thornton against Pandrea, which was signed on May 20, 
2014. 
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13. The district court unlawfully issued an additional judgment pertaining to the 
rights in the two parcels of property previously partitioned, which 
subsequent judgment was precluded by the legally binding and conclusive 
effect of the resulting Judgment and Decree of Partition entered in the prior 
litigation. 
m. STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
A. New Issue-Standing 
This Court first addresses questions of standing to determine whether or not it is 
necessary to reach the remaining issues on appeal. Also, because the issue of standing is 
jurisdictional, Van Valkenburgh v. Citizens for Term Limits, 135 Idaho 121, 124, 15 P.3d 1129, 
1132 (2000), it may be raised at any time, Hoppe v. McDonald, 103 Idaho 33, 35, 644 P.2d 
355, 357 (1982). 
Tungsten Holdings, Inc. v. Drake,_143 Idaho 69, 72, 137 P.3d 456 (2006). 
B. New Issue-Application of Idaho Code§ 6-515 is Purely a Question of Law 
Where issues on appeal involve questions oflaw, a reviewing court exercises free review. 
Clements Farms, Inc. v. Ben Fish and Son, 120 Idaho 185, 814 P. 2d 917 (1991). An issue 
involving a statutory construction and interpretation is a question of law, which is reviewed de 
novo. State Dept. of Health and Welfare v. Haousel, 140 Idaho 96, 100, 102, 90 P. 3d 321, 325, 
327 (2004). 
A synopsis of the acceptable standard of review used by this Court in considering pure 
questions of law raised initially on appeal can be found in the dissenting opinion of Justice 
Bistline in Ochoa v. STATE, INDUS. SPEC. INDEM. FUND, 794 P. 2d 1127 at 1133, 1134-
ldaho Supreme Court 1990: 
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This court may consider a pure question of law even if not raised below where refusal to 
reach the issue would result in a miscarriage of justice or where the issue's resolution is 
of public importance. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Fernandez, 741 F.2d 355, 360-61 
(11th Cir.1984). 
This is echoed by the position of the Ninth Circuit Court that "[g]enerally, this court 
should not consider arguments that the appellant failed to raise below. Rothman v. Hospital 
Service of Southern California, 510 F.2d 956, 960 (9th Cir.1975). Application of the rule is 
discretionary. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 2877, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 
(1976). 
However, this court may dispense with the waiver rule when "the question is a purely 
legal one that is both central to the case and important to the public." In Re Sells, 719 F.2d 985, 
990 (9th Cir.1983). "It is well settled in this circuit that where the new issue is purely a legal one, 
the injection of which would not have caused the parties to develop new or different facts, we 
may resolve it on appeal, "United States v. Dann, 706 F.2d 919, 925 n. 5 (9th Cir.1983), "the 
rationale is that a legal question does not depend on the factual record below, or that the pertinent 
record is fully developed and easily applied to the legal theory". United States v. Patrin, 573 
F.2d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 1978). 
C. Summary Judgment 
On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this Court utilizes the same 
standard of review used by the district court originally ruling on the motion. Summary judgment 
is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
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entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." IR. C.P. 56(c). When considering whether the 
evidence in the record shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the trial court must 
liberally construe the facts, and draw all reasonable inferences, in favor of the nonmoving party. 
Golub v. Kirk-Hughes Dev., LLC, 158 Idaho 73, 75-76, 343 P.3d 1080, 1082-83 (2015) (quoting 
Conner v. Hodges, 157 Idaho 19, 23,333 P.3d 130, 134 (2014)). 
D. Motion to Reconsider 
When a district court decides a motion to reconsider, "the district court must apply the 
same standard of review that the court applied when deciding the original order that is being 
reconsidered." Westby v. Schaefer, 157 Idaho 616, 621, 338 P.3d 1220, 1225 (2014); Fragnella 
v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 276, 281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012). If the original order was within the 
trial court's discretion, then so is the decision to grant or deny the motion to reconsider. Id. 
When this Court reviews a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for 
reconsideration, they use the same standard of review the lower court used in deciding the 
motion for reconsideration. Id. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. STANDING 
ISSUE ON APPEAL #12 
1. CLARK did not own the dominant estate to the THORNTON servient estate 
and did not have standing to request a declatory judgment granting the relief 
CLARK received. 
A prerequisite to a declaratory judgment action is an actual or justiciable controversy. 
Harris v. Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513, 681 P.2d 988 (1984). In this case, CLARK sought 
declatory judgment on one particular legal theory in a motion for partial summary judgment. To 
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establish that CLARK had an actual or justiciable claim, she must frrst meet the standing 
requirements for the claim being made. Generally, justiciability questions are divisible into 
several sub-categories: advisory opinions, feigned and collusive cases, standing, ripeness, 
mootness, political questions and administrative questions. Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 
635, 639, 778 P.2d 757, 761 (1989). 
The Declaratory Judgment Act provides authority for the courts to render declaratory 
judgments. State v. Rhoades, 121 Idaho 63, 69, 822 P.2d 960, 966 (1991). However, the 
Declaratory Judgment Act does not relieve a party from showing that it has standing to bring the 
action in the frrst instance. Selkirk-Priest Basin Assoc., Inc. v. State ex rel. Batt, 128 Idaho 831, 
834, 919 P.2d 1032, 1035 (1996). 
Although not all easements must serve the dominant estate holder, such as easements en 
gross6 (which do not attach to property) or public easements7 (Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 
767, 774, 133 P.3d 1232, 1239 {2006)); an express or appurtenant easement serves only the 
dominant estate holder as [a]n easement appurtenant "is one whose benefits serve a parcel of 
land. More exactly, it serves the owner of that land in a way that cannot be separated from his 
rights in the land." Abbott v. Nampa Sch. Dist. No. 131, 119 Idaho 544, 550, 808 P.2d 1289, 
1295 (1991) (quotation omitted) 
6 Citing: Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225, 230, 76 P.3d 969, 974 (2003); King v. Lang, 136 Idaho 905, 909, 42 P.3d 
698, 702(2002)and 
7 Bente/ v. Bannock County, 104 Idaho 130, 133, 656 P.2d 1383, 1386 (1983) (discussing a public prescriptive 
easement). 
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CLARK claimed that an express easement existed crossing the THORNTON property to 
reach CLARK'S dominant parcel. (R. Vol. I, P. 64, 14) 
As this Court has repeatedly concluded "[t]o have standing to enforce the dominant 
estate's rights over the servient estate, CLARK must demonstrate that she is the owner of the 
dominant estate. Tungsten Holdings, Inc. v. Drake, 143 Idaho 69, 72, 137 P.3d 456,459 (2006); 
citing Beach Lateral Water Users Ass'n, 142 Idaho at 604, 130 P.3d at 1142; see Christensen v. 
City of Pocatello, 142 Idaho at 136, 124 P.3d at 1012. 
In this case, it is imperative to first define ''what" the dominant estate was before 
establishing "who" owned it. In this regard, the district court failed to properly delineate the 
correct dominant tenement. 
a. The dominant parcel was the remaining portion of the original Warranty 
Deed, Instrument Number 226223 after severance of a portion of this "Tract 
of Land". 
There was no ambiguity in the conveying deed from 1992, Quitclaim Deed, Instrument 
Number 416381. "The existence of ambiguity determines the standard of review of a lower 
court's interpretation of a contract or instrument." Mountainview Landowners Coop. Ass 'n. Inc. 
v. Cool, 139 Idaho 770, 772, 86 P. 3d 484,486 (2004) Citing: Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Ethington 
Fam. Trust, 137 Idaho 435, 437-38, 50 P. 3d 450, 452-53 (2002) "The legal effect of an 
unambiguous written document must be decided by the trial court as a question oflaw." Id., 
Citing: Latham v. Garner, 105 ldaho 854,857,673 P. 2d 1048, 1051 (1983). 
The deed of conveyance in 1992 (Instrument Number 4163 81) unambiguously contains 
the identity of the parties, a description of the property being conveyed, the words of conveyance 
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and the intention to burden the property with an easement. Machado v. Ryan, 153 Idaho 212, 
218,280 P.3d 715, 721 (2012) 
The property being conveyed in Instrument Number 416381 was a metes and bounds 
description of: 
"That portion of the following described Tract lying Southeasterly of the Centerline of 
Tavern Creek: 
A tract ofland located in Section 11, Township 59 North, Range 2 West, Boise Meridian, 
Bonner County, Idaho, more fully described as follows: 
Commencing at the Southeast comer of said Section 11 ... to the point of beginning" 
Subject to and reserving a 30.0 foot easement (also located southeasterly of the 
centerline ofTavem Creek) for a road right of way and utilities, more fully described as 
follows: 
A tract ofland for a road easement located in Section 11, Township 59 North, Range 2 
West, Boise Meridian, Bonner County, Idaho, said road easement being 30.0 feet wide 
(15.0 feet from each side of the centerline) the centerline being more fully described as 
follows: 
Commencing at the Southeast comer of said Section 11 ... East a distance of 300.00 feet 
more or less to the Westerly right-of-way of the Pack River County Road". 
(R. Vol. I, p. 69-70; R. VoJ. I, p. 128-129; Aff. VT, Exhibit Nine; R. Vol. II, p. 390-391) 
The "Tract of Land" referenced in the first conveyance described in Instrument Number 
416381 was the original "Tract of Land" described identically in Warranty Deed, Instrument 
Number 226223 as: 
"A tract ofland located in Section 11, Township 59 North, Range 2 West, Boise 
Meridian, Bonner County, Idaho, more fully described as follows: 
Commencing at the Southeast corner of said Section 11 ... to the point ofbeginning" 
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Subject to a 30.0 foot easement for a road right of way and utilities, more fully described 
as follows: 
A tract of land for a road easement located in Section 11, Township 59 North, Range 2 
West, Boise Meridian, Bonner County, Idaho, said road easement being 30.0 feet wide 
(15.0 feet from each side of the centerline) the centerline being more fully described as 
foilows: 
Commencing at the Southeast corner of said Section I I ... East a distance of300.00 feet 
more or less to the Westerly right-of-way of the Pack River County Road". 
(Aff. VT, Exhibit Three, ,r 2) 
Based on the unambiguous deed of conveyance (#416381 ), and the unambiguous original 
deed of record described as the conveying "Tract of Land" (#226223), it is clear that the 
dominant tenement in this conveyance is the remaining portion of the original Warranty Deed, 
Instrument 226223 lying Northwesterly of the centerline of Tavern Creek. 
b. The Chain of Title for Warranty Deed, Instrument Number 226223, 
conclusively shows that CLARK does not own the dominant estate to the 
THORNTON servient estate. 
Idaho law next looks to the ownership of the dominant estate to establish ''who" has 
standing in an action such as this. Tungsten, supra. 
The Chain of Title for Warranty Deed, Instrument Number 226223, wherein the dominant 
estate lies, was not properly established by the district court. From the point of severance in 
1992 of the .56 acres from Warranty Deed, Instrument Number 226223, until January 24, 2014, 
the original "grantors" named in Instrument Number 416381 co-owned the remaining 4.44 acre 
portion of Warranty Deed, Instrument Number 226223. The "grantors" named on the 1992 
conveying deed (Instrument 416381) were PANDREA and CLARK. 
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Transfer of ownership in the dominant 4.44 acre portion of Warranty Deed, Instrument 
Number 226223 occurred on January 24, 2014, with PANDREA named as the owner. (R. Vol. I, 
p. 140-142) As easements pass with property, the easement reserved in Quitclaim Deed, 
Instrument Number 416381for the dominant 4.44 acre portion of Warranty Deed, Instrument 
Number 226223, also transferred to P ANDREA. Idaho Code § 55-603ii. 
CLARK no longer owned the dominant estate as of January 24, 2014 and no longer had 
standing to make her claim. 
Judge Mitchell cites to the proposition in Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho, 225, 76 P. 3d 969 
(2003), that "anyone whom either P ANDREA or CLARK transfer their property to in the future, 
will receive the benefit of the easement across THORNTON's land" (R. Vol. II, p. 540, ,r 2, L. 
17-19); yet, he failed to apply this legal standard to CLARK's transfer of ownership in the 
dominant estate ( #226223) to P ANDREA by way of the Judgment and Decree of Partition. 
The Judgment and Decree of Partition was the final legally binding document in the 
Chain of Title for Warranty Deed, Instrument Number 226223 showing ownership in the 
dominant 4.44 acre portion of this deed being conveyed to PANDREA. It states that: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
The following twelve and 739/lOOOs (12.739) acres of real property and any 
appurtenances thereon are hereby awarded to Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, Mary E. 
Pandrea: 
A tract of land situated in the Southeast Quarter (SE Y4) of Section Eleven, Township 
Fifty-nine (59) North, Range Two (2) West of the Boise Meridian, Bonner County, 
Idaho, being a portion of that parcel described in Instrument No. 396781 and a portion of 
that parcel described in Instrument number 226223;". (R. Vol. I, p. 139, ,r 3) 
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While CLARK received "10.423 acres of Instrument Number 396781 and "any 
appurtenances thereon" and no portion of Instrument Number 226223 as a result of the 
Judgment and Decree of Partition. (R. Vol. I, p. 140, ,r 2) 
The "Tract of Land'' within the original 1991 Warranty Deed, Instrument Number 
396781 was described as: 
A tract ofland located in Section 11, Township 59 North, Range 2 West of the Boise 
Meridian, Bonner County , Idaho, more fully described as follows: 
Commencing at the South Quarter Corner of said Section 11. .. West a distance of 
330.00 feet more or less to the point of beginning. 
(Aff. ofVT, Exhibit Five, ,r 1) 
At no time in the underlying case did the district court determine that CLARK owned any 
portion of Instrument Number 226223. The district court only determined that Instrument 
Number 226223 was land conveyed to PANDREA. (R. Vol. II, ,r 1, L. 4-5) 
HOWEVER, in the final judgment issued in this case, the district court ordered that 
CLARK had a right to use "a portion of that easement previously described in Instrument 
Number 226223" to reach "a portion of Instrument Number 396781", described more 
particularly in the Judgment as: 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDED AND DECREED that as set forth in Warranty 
Deed, Bonner County Instrument No. 525386 (the THORNTON DEED) and Quitclaim 
Deed, Bonner County Instrument Number 416381, KARI A. CLARK and KARI A. 
CLAR.K's heirs, successors and assigns have a 30.0 foot appurtenant easement for road 
right of way and utilities across the following described Tract lying Southeasterly of 
the Centerline of Tavern Creek: 
Commencing at the Southeast comer of said Section 11 ... 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the appurtenant 
easement across the above described tract of land is situated in the Southeast Quarter (SE 
V4) of Section Eleven (11), Township Fifty-nine (59) North, Range Two (2) West of the 
Boise Meridian, Bonner County, Idaho being a portion of that easement previously 
described in Instrument No. 226223, which is Thirty (30) feet in width and lying 
Fifteen (15) feet on each side of the following described centerline: 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the above described 
appurtenant easement grants KARI A. CLARK and KARI A. CLARK's heir, successors 
and assigns the right to use said easement for right of way and utilities to the 
following described ten and 423/lOOO's (10.423) acres of real property that were 
awarded to KARI A. CLARK pursuant to the Revised Judgment and Decree of 
Partition entered in Bonner County Case No. CV-2011-835: 
A tract ofland situated in the Southeast Quarter (SEl/4) of Section Eleven, 
Township Fifty-nine (59) North, Range Two (2) West of the Boise Meridian, 
Bonner County, Idaho, being a portion of that parcel described in Instrument 
No. 396781;'' 
(Second Amended Final Judgment, Attachment 9, p. 2-3; to the Augmented Record on Appeal) 
c. Summary of Argument. 
The district court failed to properly identify the conveying "Tract of Land" in Quitclaim 
Deed, Instrument Number 416381(1 st conveyance)8 to be the original Warranty Deed, Instrument 
Number 226223; failed to recognize that CLARK no longer owned the dominant 4.44 acre 
portion of Warranty Deed, Instrument Number 226223; and failed to conclude as a result that 
CLARK did not have standing. 
The current Ownership in the original Warranty Deed, Instrument Number 226223 is 
held in part by P ANDREA and in part by THORNTON. Of the original 5 acres, THORNTON 
8 Instrument Number 39678 l briefly conveyed property to the THORNTON'S predecessor in 1992, described as the 
second conveyance in Quitclaim Deed, Instrument Number 416381; however that conveyance was unwound a short 
time later and prior to the recordation of the THORNTON Warranty Deed, Instrument Number 525386. 
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owns the servient .56 acres as described in his 1998 Warranty Deed, Instrument Number 525386 
(Aff. IT, Exhibit One-J, R. Vol. II, p. 395-398); and PANDREA owns the remaining original 
dominant 4.44 acre portion, as described in the 2014 Judgment and Decree of Partition. (R. Vol. 
I, p. 139, ~ 3) 
Because CLARK did not have ownership of the dominant estate, she did not have 
standing to request declatory relief, as there was no actual or justiciable controversy at issue. As 
standing cannot be established by CLARK, the remaining issues on appeal regarding the 
easement appurtenant to PANDREA's property need not be reached. However, should this 
Court conclude otherwise, PANDREA's remaining arguments will address these issues. 
B. Application of Idaho Code § 6-515 is Purely a Question of Law 
ISSUE ON APPEAL #13 
2. The district court unlawfully issued an additional judgment pertaining to the 
rights in the two parcels of property previously partitioned, which 
subsequent judgment was precluded by the legally binding and conclusive 
effect of the resulting Judgment and Decree of Partition entered in the prior 
litigation. 
The preclusive effect of the Judgment and Decree of Partition was evidence on record 
before the district court (in this instant case) of the legally binding and conclusive disposition of 
the two parcels and their respectively awarded easement rights. 
a. Idaho Code § 6-515 
As is required under Idaho Code 6-515 partitioning statute: 
Upon the report being confirmed, judgment must be rendered that such partition be effectual 
forever, which judgment is binding and conclusive: 
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1. On all persons named as parties to the action, and their legal representatives, who 
have at the time any interest in the property divided, or any part thereof, as owners in fee or 
as tenants for life or for years, or as entitled to the reversion, remainder, or the inheritance of 
such property, or of any part thereof, after the determination of a particular estate therein, and 
who by any contingency may be entitled to a beneficial interest in the property, or who have an 
interest in any undivided share thereof, as tenants for years or for life. 
Legislative defmitions of terms included within a statute control and dictate the meaning 
of those terms as used in the statute. Roe v. Hopper, 90 Idaho 22,408 P.2d 161 (1965). CLARK 
was clearly a '1)erson named as a party to the action" within the legally binding and conclusive 
body of language both within the Judgment and Decree of Partition document (R. Vol. I, p. 141, 
~ 5) and under Idaho Code § 6-515. Just as clearly, "forever'', "binding" and "conclusive" are 
contractual words that legally bind the parties to the terms of the partition. Lastly, the words 
"any interest in the property divided, or any part thereof" would include easement interests. 
Idaho Code§ 6-515 
The determination of whether or not the statute is applicable is a matter of law (reviewed 
de novo). Floyd v. Board of Comm'rs of Bonneville County,_131 Idaho 234, 953 P.2d 568 
( 1998). Interpretation of an instrument, such as the Judgment and Decree of Partition, is also a 
question oflaw. Chaves v. Barrus, 146 Idaho 212, 192 P. 3d 1036 (2008). 
A statute must be construed as a whole, taking the literal words of the statute, which 
words must be given their plain, usual and ordinary meaning. Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 137 
Idaho, 473, 50 P. 3d 488 (2002); State v. Hart, 134 Idaho 827, 25 P. 3d 850 (2001). If a statute is 
not ambiguous, the Court does not construe it, but simply applies the ordinary meaning. Hansen 
v. State Farm 1\1.ut. Auto Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 663, 735 P. 2d 974 (1987). Unless the result is 
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palpably absurd, or legislative intent is clearly to the contrary, a Court must assume that the 
legislature means what is clearly stated in the statute. Miller v. State, 110 Idaho 298, 715 P. 2d 
968 (1986); Garza v. State, 139 Idaho 533, 82 P. 3d 445 (2003). 
b. The Standards of Review are Applicable 
1. According to the standards set forth in the Standards of Review section of this 
brief, in order for a pure question of law to be considered by this Court, there should not be any 
further additional facts that would need to be developed in this case. See, Ochoa, supra. This 
standard has been met, as a copy of the Judgment and Decree of Partition was used as evidence 
in the underlying case and is in the record on appeal at R. Vol. I, p. l 38-143. 
This leaves only a pure matter of law before this Court in determining the application of 
the ordinary meaning of Idaho Code 6-515. P ANDREA argues that the subsequent judgment 
was unlawful, and that the application of the plain and ordinary language within Idaho Code§ 6-
515 would support this argument. 
2. The second standard is whether or not a miscarriage of justice resulted when the 
legally binding and conclusive terms of the Judgment and Decree of Partition, as set forth in 
Idaho Code § 6-515, were violated when additional litigation resulted in a "change" to the 
preceding terms of the Partition and Decree of Partition. See, Ochoa, supra. 
This "miscarriage of justice" occurred when the Judgment in this underlying case did in 
fact alter the "interest in the property divided, or any part thereof" by granting CLARK a 
new right in the property divided. 
When the legally binding and conclusive Judgment and Decree of Partition was issued 
on January 24, 2014, PANDREA was the only "person named as a party to the action" who 
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retained the legally described easement appurtenant to the 4.44 acre portion of Warranty Deed, 
Instrument Number 226223. (R. Vol. I, p. 139, 1 2-1 3) This changed when CLARK was 
granted the same easement in the subsequent Judgment, finalized on February 25, 2015. (Second 
Amended Final Judgment, Attachment 9, p. 2-3; to the Augmented Record on Appeal) 
c. Summary of Argument 
It was plainly written in the partition deed that: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
The following twelve and 739/lOOOs (12.739) acres of real property and any 
appurtenances thereon are hereby awarded to Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, Mary E. 
Pandrea: 
A tract of land situated in the Southeast Quarter (SE V,i) of Section Eleven, Township 
Fifty-nine (59) North, Range Two (2) West of the Boise Meridian, Bonner County, 
Idaho, being a portion of that parcel described in Instrument No. 396781 and a portion of 
that parcel described in Instrument number 226223;". 
(R. Vol. I, p. 139, 13) 
The required language of Idaho Code 6-515 was also included in the Judgment and 
Decree of Partition. (Id. at p. 141,il 5, 16, 17 and p. 142, 11) 
In contravention to Idaho Code § 6-515, the district court not only allowed CLARK'S 
claim to proceed, but then issued an unlawful judgment granting CLARK an additional interest 
in the properties so divided, namely allowing CLARK to use the easement appurtenant to 
PANDREA's individually owned partitioned parcel. This was a miscarriage of justice 
substantially affecting both THORNTON and PANDREA's property rights; while 
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simultaneously denying PANDREA's due process rights to defend against the unlawful claim 
and resulting unlawful judgment. 
APPELLANT ISSUES ON APPEAL 
THORNTON assigns ELEVEN ( 11) issues presented on appeal. P ANDREA responds as 
follows as to ISSUE #1 AND ISSUE #2: 
APPELLANT'S ISSUE #1: Was it an abuse of discretion for the district court to 
determine factual issues on summary judgment where the matter was set for jury 
trial? 
APPELLANT'S ISSUE #2: Was it error to interpret the Warranty Deed as giving 
notice of an Easement in favor of Clark, as a matter of law, whether or not she still 
owned the dominant estate? 
PANDREA'S RESPONSE TO ISSUE #1 and ISSUE #2: 
C. PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
THORNTON correctly assigns error to the district court's abuse of discretion m 
determining partial summary judgment. 
This Court reviews challenges to a trial court's evidentiary rulings under an abuse of 
discretion standard. See-Perry v. Magic Valley Reg'l Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46, 50-51, 995 P.2d 
816, 820-21 (2000). To determine whether a trial court has abused its discretion, this Court 
considers whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as discretionary, whether it acted 
within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards, and 
whether it reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Id. Error is disregarded as harmless 
unless the ruling affects a substantial right of the party. Id.; I.RE. 103(a); I.R.C.P. 61. 
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The district court had the discretion to determine whether or not the evidence on record 
for partial summary judgment was substantial and relevant evidence to conclusively fulfill the 
required legal standards used to determine if summary judgment is appropriate. Namely, 
whether or not the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c). 
When considering whether the evidence in the record shows that there is no genuine issue 
of material fact, the trial court must liberally construe the facts, and draw all reasonable 
inferences, in favor of the nonmoving party. Golub v. Kirk-Hughes Dev., LLC, 158 Idaho 73, 75-
76, 343 P.3d 1080, 1082-83 (2015) (quoting Conner v. Hodges, 157 Idaho 19, 23,333 P.3d 130, 
134 (2014)). 
a. The district court abused its discretion by applying the wrong legal standard, as 
there was a genuine issue of material fact as to the accuracy of CLARK's allegations of the 
existence of "one 20 Acre Parcel". 
The only evidence to support CLARK's allegation that she and PANDREA had 
partitioned "one 20 Acre Parcel" was the allegation itself (R. Vol. I, p. 63,, 5) There is no deed 
ofrecord ( or chain ohitle) on record to substantiate this claim. 
The evidence on record contradicted CLARK's claim of "one 20 Acre Parcel" as the 
Judgment and Decree of Partition described a partition which included two separate Instrument 
Numbers: Instrument Number 226223 and Instrument Number 396781. (R. Vol. I, p. 138-143) 
The evidence on record contradicted CLARK's claim of "one 20 Acre Parcel" as the 
Judgment and Decree of Partition described a combined acreage of 23 .162 acres. (Id.) 
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Therefore, there was a genuine issue of material fact, as CLARK's conflict between the 
allegation and the evidence on record were unresolved when partial summary judgment was 
made. The district court relied on CLARK's allegation to conclude that since the easement 
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Acre Parcel" that the easement now would appertain to each of the resulting parcels for CLARK 
and P ANDREA at the conclusion of the Judgment and Decree of Partition. 
This was an abuse of discretion, as the required standard for partial summary judgment 
should have been to deny CLARK, as the moving party, as there was an unresolved genuine 
issue of material fact at large. 
b. The district court abused its discretion in determining partial summary judgment 
in favor or CLARK, without evidence that CLARK's property was descn"bed within the conveying 
parcel when the easement was created. 
At the time that partial summary judgment was decided, CLARK had not provided any 
evidence that the 10.423 acres she received in the partition made up any portion of the "Tract of 
Land" described within the conveying property (shown as the first conveyance) within Quitclaim 
Deed, Instrument Number 416381. 
This could only have been established by the district court's review of the chain of title 
for Warranty Deed, Instrument Number 396781, as the Judgment and Decree of Partition on 
record before the district court clearly showed that CLARK had been awarded "a portion of that 
parcel described in Instrument Number 396781" (R. Vol. 1, p. 140, if3). 
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On January 24, 2014, in addition to PANDREA being awarded all of the remaining 4.44 
acre portion of Warranty Deed, Instrument Number 226223 (with THORNTON still owning the 
.56 acre portion); a second parcel was divided between CLARK and PANDREA. 
This was an 18.72 acre parcel originally recorded as Warranty Deed, Instrument Number 
396781. P ANDREA received 8.29 acres of this second parcel (which was added to 
PANDREA's awarded 4.44 acres in the first parcel #226223 by way of a lot line adjustment 
between the two ajoining parcels); and CLARK received 10.423 acres of this second parcel. (R. 
Vol. I, p. 139, ,r 3 and 140, ,r 3) 
The district court did not have any evidence prior to deciding the partial summary 
judgment that the conveying "Tract of Land" as described in Quitclaim Deed, Instrument 
Number 416381 (the first conveyance) was related in any way to any portion of Warranty Deed, 
Instrument Number 396781. 
The only documents relied on by the district court to determine partial summary 
judgment were Instrument Number 416381, the THORNTON Warranty Deed, Instrument 
Number 525386, and a copy of the Judgment and Decree of Partition from BON-CV-2011-835 
that were all attached to the affidavit of CLARK's attorney, Joel P. Hazel. The remaining 
conclusions were drawn from CLARK's allegations and the affidavit of her niece Terri Boyd-
Davis. (R. Vol. II, p. 272, ,r 2) 
The problem is that no evidence existed to substantiate that any part of the property 
owned by CLARK was actually included in the conveying parcel described within the first 
conveyance in Instrument Number 416381. The THORNTON's Warranty Deed, Instrument 
Number 525386 put THORNTON on notice in 1998 that an easement burdened his property as a 
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result of Instrument Number 416381. Additionally, CLARK and P ANDREA were named as the 
owners in 1998 of the "Tract of Land" as described in the first property conveyance shown on 
Instrument Number 416381. But, nowhere in the evidence used to determine the partial 
summary judgment was there a deed depicting what "Tract of Land" the conveyance was made 
from, or whether or not CLARK and P ANDREA still owned the conveying "Tract of Land". 
Instead, the district court simply concluded that the language in the THORNTON 
Warranty Deed, Instrument Number 525385 "establish[es] an easement" that "grants a thirty-
foot easement for a road right of way and utilities to Mary E. Pandrea and Kari A Clark for a 
right of way and utilities which serves their land ... " (R. Vol. II, p.279, ,r 5, L. 2 and p. 280, ,r 2, 
L. 10-11) 
Because the chain of title for the two parcels making up ''their land" were not taken into 
consideration ( as they were not included as evidence), there were genuine issues of material facts 
not on record, and it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to grant partial summary 
judgment. 
c. It was an abuse of discretition for the district court to determine partial summary 
judgment without resolving the conflicting evidence submitted by CLARK. 
Included within CLARK's evidence to support her motion for partial summary judgment 
was the following description of the disposition of the easement crossing the THORNTON 
property at the conclusion of the Judgment and Decree of Partition in the Record of Survey: 
The portion of the 30' wide access and utility easement through the Thornton 
property may be appurtenant to the Pandrea parcel as it was originally contained 
within Inst.# 226223. However, when Inst. #226223 extended to the County Road, the 
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property was SUBJECT TO the 30' easement. Subsequent deed, Instrument No. 
525386, reserved the same easement for the benefit of remainder of Instrument No. 
226223, after deeding a portion of that parcel in Instrument No. 525386. 
(R. Vol. I. p. 143, Easement Note) 
To ciarify, it was actuaiiy Quitciaim Deed, Instrument Number 4i638i that reserved the 
easement, while Instrument Number 525386 included a notice section of the easement reserved 
within Instrument Number 416381. Regardless, this conflicted with CLARK's allegation that 
she had a right to use the same easement to benefit Instrument Number 396781. (Respondent's 
Augmented Motion, Attachment 9, p. 3, ,r 3, L.3-4) 
Partial summary judgment was not proper with conflicting evidence being unresolved, 
especially in light of the fact that it was provided by CLARK. 
d. The district court issued an inconsistent judgment by combining legal 
standards for easements en gross and appurtenant easements. 
The partial summary judgment resulted in a Final Judgment on February 25, 2015, 
whereby CLARK was said to have a right to use a 30.0 foot easement for road right of way and 
utilities crossing the THORNTON property, "being a portion of that easement previously 
described in Instrument Number 226223. . " and that the appurtenant easement "assigns the right 
to use said easement for right of way and utilities to the 10.423 acres ... " "being a portion of that 
parcel described in 396781 ". (Respondent's Augmented Motion, Attachment 9, p. 2-3). 
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The primary distinction between an easement in gross and an easement appurtenant is 
that in the latter there is, and in the former there is not, a dominant estate to which the 
easement is attached. West v. Smith, 95 Idaho 550, 511 P.2d 1326 (1973). An easement in gross 
is merely a personal interest in the land of another, (Id.); whereas an easement appurtenant is an 
interest which is annexed to the possession of the dominant tenement and passes with it. 
Nelson v. Johnson, I 06 Idaho 385, 387, 679 P.2d 662,664, 665 (1984) Citing: 3, Powell on Real 
Property§ 418, at 34-216 (1981). An appurtenant easement must bear some relation to the use of 
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the dominant estate and is incapable of existence separate from it; any attempted severance 
from the dominant estate must fail. West at 34-217. 
The appurtenant easement awarded to CLARK does not reach, or attach to the portion of 
Instrument Nu___mber 396781 that she was awarded i.11 the Judgment and Decree of Partition. It 
reaches and attaches to PANDREA's parcel. 
Currently, the Barrett's use the easement granted to them in this underlying case not to 
reach the parcel that transferred to CLARK in the preceding Judgment and Decree of Partition; 
but to reach the 10 foot eighteen course "road" easement created in the Judgment and Degree 
of Partition. Depending on the outcome of the pending previous appeal, should the 10 foot 
eighteen course "road" easement be found to prejudice P ANDREA and be reversed, the Barrett's 
will not be able to reach their parcel using the "appurtenant easement" granted to CLARK in this 
case. 
Because the easement described for CLARK in the Final Judgment does not "attach or 
reach" the parcel described in the Final Judgment, it would meet the defmition of an easement en 
gross, not appurtenant. This conflicts with the language contained within the Final Judgment 
which references the easement as "appurtenant". It also means that the wrong legal standards 
were applied, as CLARK was granted an appurtenant easement, yet it does not meet the 
requirements necessary to consider it as such. 
D. MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
THORNTON correctly assigns error to the district court's denial of the Reconsideration 
Motion filed at conclusion of the partial judgment. 
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When a district court decides a motion to reconsider, "the district court must apply the 
same standard of review that the court applied when deciding the original order that is being 
reconsidered." Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266,276,281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012). The 
standard of review in this case would rely on the same standards used to determine partial 
summary judgment in favor of CLARK. As the moving party, THORNTON was entitled to 
judgment in his favor upon the reconsideration of new information absent any genuine issues of 
material fact. 
As a result of the Reconsideration Motion, THORNTON succeeded in establishing for 
the district court the chain of title for the two parcels that were partitioned between CLARK and 
PANDREA in BON-CV-2011-835. The significance of this new information was that the 
original deed of record for Instrument Number 226223 conclusively supported that the "Tract of 
Land" described within the first conveyance in Quitclaim Deed, Instrument 416381 was one in 
the same with the "Tract of Land" described within Warranty Deed, Instrument Number 226223. 
Without a doubt, the identity of the conveying "Tract of Land" wherein the easement had 
originated had been established by the submission of Warranty Deed, Instrument Number 
226223. The district court was then in possession of the deeds ofrecord for both the dominant 
estate (226223) and the servient estate (525386) described within Quitclaim Deed, Instrument 
Number 4163 81. The Judgment and Decree of Partition on record also provided conclusive 
evidence that P ANDREA was the owner of the dominant estate (226223). 
In light of this information, the district court correctly concluded that the dominant estate 
was created in 1992; that "at that moment" PANDREA and CLARK owned the dominant estate 
as tenants in common until January 24, 2014 (R. Vol. II, p. 540, ,-r 2, L. 8-12); then incorrectly 
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reiterates the previous concurrence with CLARK that "one 20 Acre Parcel" had been divided in 
the partition, stating that this was "uncontroverted" evidence (R. Vol. II, p. 536, ,r 1) and that 
"[a]ll Judge Luster did on January 24, 2014, in a different lawsuit, was to partition that property 
between Pandrea and Clark, but Pandrea and Clark still own the dominant estate. (R. Vol. II, 
p. 540, ,r 2, L. 8-12) 
Based on the "unambiguous" deeds of record in this case, it is unclear how the district 
court arrived at these conclusions. A review of the record on appeal will show that THORNTON 
owns the servient estate (lying southeasterly of the centerline of Tavern Creek) and that 
PANDREA owns the dominant estate (lying northwesterly of the centerline of Tavern Creek) as 
described within both Warranty Deed, Instrument Number 226223 and within Instrument 
Number 416381. As such, partial summary judgment should have been issued in favor of 
THORNTON as a result of the Reconsideration Motion. 
V. CONCLUSION 
CLARK did not have standing to pursue this claim and the Judgment in this case should 
be reversed in favor of THORNTON. Furthermore, the district court should not have unlawfully 
issued a subsequent Judgment in violation ofldaho Code§ 6-515, which would nullify the 
validity of the Judgment in this case. In the alternative, the judgment should be reversed in favor 
of THORNTON on his reconsideration motion based on the unambiguous deeds ofrecord in this 
case for the three parcels of property at issue. 
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i 6-515. REPORT OF REFEREES -- CONFIRMATION -- JUDGMENT. The court may 
confirm, change, modify or set aside the report, and if necessary appoint new referees. Upon the 
report being confrrmed, judgment must be rendered that such partition be effectual forever, 
which judgment is binding and conclusive: 
I. On all persons named as parties to the action, and their legal representatives, who have 
at the time any interest in the property divided, or any part thereof, as owners in fee or as tenants 
for life or for years, or as entitled to the reversion, remainder, or the inheritance of such property, 
or of any part thereof, after the determination of a particular estate therein, and who by any 
contingency may be entitled to a beneficial interest in the property, or who have an interest in 
any undivided share thereof, as tenants for years or for life. 
2. On all persons interested in the property, who may be unknown, to whom notice has 
been given of the action for partition by publication. 
3. On all other persons claiming from such parties or persons or either of them. And no 
judgment is invalidated by reason of the death of any party before final judgment or decree; but 
such judgment or decree is as conclusive against the heirs, legal representatives or assigns of 
such decedent as if it had been entered before his death. 
ii Idaho Code§ 55-603 EASEMENTS PASS WITH PROPERTY. A transfer of real property 
passes all easements attached thereto, and creates in favor thereof an easement to use other real 
property of the person whose estate is transferred, in the same manner and to the same extent as 
such property was obviously and permanently used by the person whose estate is transferred, for 
the benefit thereof, at the time when the transfer was agreed upon or completed. 
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